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Abstract The sense of commitment is a fundamental build-
ing block of human social life. By generating and/or stabiliz-
ing expectations about contributions that individual agents
will make to the goals of other agents or to shared goals, a
sense of commitment can facilitate the planning and coordi-
nation of actions involving multiple agents. Moreover, it can
also increase individual agents’ motivation to contribute to
other agents’ goals or to shared goals, as well as their will-
ingness to rely on other agents’ contributions. In this paper,
we provide a starting point for designing robots that exhibit
and/or elicit a sense of commitment.We identify several chal-
lenges that such a project would likely confront, and consider
possibilities for meeting these challenges.
Keywords Commitment ·Trust ·Human–robot interaction ·
Joint action · Cooperation · Coordination
1 Introduction
There is a vast potential for robots to assist humans in joint
actions in many different domains, from disaster relief to
health care, education, and manufacturing. As roboticists
move forward in optimizing human–robot interactions in
order to tap this potential, it may be fruitful to consider one
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particular question pertaining to the challenge of designing
robots with whom humans can interact comfortably and pro-
ductively in various kinds of joint action. Specifically: Is it
possible to design robots that elicit and/or exhibit a sense
of commitment—i.e. such that (i) humans agents are moti-
vated by a sense of commitment toward them, (ii), human
agents expect them to bemotivated by a sense of commitment
toward human agents, (iii) they are motivated by a sense of
commitment toward human agents, and/or (iv) they expect
human agents to be motivated by a sense of commitment
toward them. To the extent that it is feasible to implement
one or more of these forms of a sense of commitment in
human–robot interaction, this could be useful insofar as it
could enhance human agents’ willingness to rely on robots
(e.g. to perform actions which depend upon a contribution
from a robot and otherwise entail a risk), could motivate
human agents to perform important actions which they other-
wisemight not perform (e.g. to practice new skills which they
are learning with a robot collaborator, to take their pills reg-
ularly because they have made a commitment to their robot
nurse that they will do so, or more generally, to promote
therapeutic interactions—especially with regard to elderly
people, cf. [1]).
In a nutshell, a sense of commitment could be highly use-
ful in optimizing human–robot interactions, since the sense
of commitment, as we will be arguing in a moment, serves
important functions which are of great benefit in human–
human interactions. In the following, we will address this
issue in three steps: we will first (Sect. 2) lay out some con-
ceptual preliminaries pertaining to commitment and the sense
of commitment, to the social functions thereof, and to the
ways inwhich commitment and the sense of commitment can
be generated and sustained in human–human interactions.
We will then (Sect. 3) identify and discuss a general concep-
tual challenge that arises when we examine the possibility
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of implementing commitment in the strict sense in human–
robot interaction. We endorse a pragmatic approach to this
challenge, which remains neutral as to whether commitment
in the strict sense is possible in human–robot interaction,
but which articulates the notion of a sense of commitment
in such a way that it is clearly applicable in principle to
human–robot interaction. Finally, (Sect. 4), we will iden-
tify several concrete factors which may be useful in practice
for implementing the sense of commitment in human–robot
interaction.
2 Conceptual Preliminaries
2.1 Commitment and the Sense of Commitment
When human agents are performing a joint action together,
they typically have a sense of being committed to remaining
engaged until the shared goal is achieved or until all par-
ticipants have agreed to interrupt the joint action. Thus, to
borrow Margaret Gilbert’s famous example, if two people
are taking a walk together, they are likely to take themselves
to be obligated to walk at a pace that the other can keep up
with, to refrain from suddenly veering off into the woods
without giving any explanation, and to wait for the other if
she has to tie her shoe (cf. [2]). Correspondingly, each of
them will typically expect that the other will also fulfill these
obligations, and otherwise take herself to be entitled to repri-
mand her. In the canonical case, this is because each has given
the other an assurance that they will remain committed (e.g.
they have explicitly agreed to take a walk together). But even
in the absence of explicit assurances, a more or less implicit
sense of commitment can often be generated through bodily
cues, subtle nuances of verbal communication or situational
affordances, and may have very similar effects, and be expe-
rienced in very similar ways. We therefore find it useful to
distinguish sharply between commitment, on the one hand,
and the sense of commitment on the other. We will first offer
a few remarks about commitment, and then turn our attention
to the sense of commitment.
Despite its prevalence in everyday interactions, the phe-
nomenon of commitment is surprisingly difficult to charac-
terize. According to a standard philosophical conception, a
commitment is a triadic relation among two agents and an
action, where one of the agents is obligated to perform the
action as a result of having given an assurance to the other
agent that she would do so, and of the other agent’s having
acknowledged that assurance under conditions of common
knowledge [3–5]. We will refer to commitment in this stan-
dard philosophical sense as ‘commitment in the strict sense’.
For example, Susie has an obligation to Jennifer to pick up
the kids from school because she (Susie) has expressed her
willingness to do so, and Jennifer has acknowledged this. In
the canonical case, the expression is effectuated by means of
the speech act of promising. As [4] puts it: ‘the utterance...
predicates some future act A of the speaker S... [and] counts
as the undertaking of an obligation to do A’ [4, p. 63].1
While this conception provides a clear characterization
of commitments arising through verbal agreements, Michael
et al. [6] have recently argued that it is not well-suited
to explaining how and when an implicit sense of commit-
ment can arise. To see why, consider the following example,
adapted from one discussed by the philosopher Margaret
Gilbert ([7], p. 9): Two factory workers, Polly and Pam, are
in the habit of smoking a cigarette and talking together on the
balcony during their afternoon coffee break. The sequence
is broken when one day Pam waits for Polly but she doesn’t
turn up. In this case, there has been no explicit agreement to
smoke a cigarette and talk together every day, and yet one
might nevertheless have the sense that an implicit commit-
ment is in place, and that Polly has violated that implicit
commitment. This will depend on further details about the
case. For example, if Polly and Pam have smoked and talked
together every day for two or three weeks, Polly might feel
only slightly obligated to offer an explanation, but she would
likely feel more strongly obligated if the pattern had been
repeated for two or three years. Thus, it seems that mere
repetition can give rise to an implicit sense of commitment.
Similarly, one agent’s reliance on a second agent may give
rise to a sense of commitment on the part of the second agent.
If, for example, Polly and Pam always use Polly’s lighter, and
Pam at some point even stopped bringing her own lighter,
then Polly’s absence will completely undermine Pam’s goal
of enjoying a pleasant cigarette break. In such a case, both
parties are likely to think that an explanation, and perhaps
even an apology, is all the more in order. Thirdly, one agent’s
investment of effort or resources in a joint action may also
give rise to a sense of commitment on the part of a second
agent. If Pam, for example, must walk up five flights of stairs
to reach the balcony where she and Polly habitually smoke
together, Polly’s sense of commitment may be greater than
if Pam only had to walk down the hall.
This example reveals that there are many situational fac-
tors which can give rise to a sense of commitment, and which
1 This standard conception helps to make clear how commitment dif-
fers from the related phenomenonof trust: unlike trust, commitments are
linked to specific actions. Jennifer may trust Susie in general to behave
in a responsible manner, to honor her commitments, etc. But her trust in
Susie does not yet suffice for her to expect Susie to to pick up the kids
today or for her to judge that Susie is obligated to do so. It is not until
Susie has agreed to perform this particular action that a commitment
in the strict sense arises to perform this particular action. Thus, while
the concept of trust picks out a general disposition to expect an agent
to behave in a manner that supports one’s interests and well-being, the
concept of commitment picks out specific obligations to perform spe-
cific actions, which arise because of agreements that have intentionally
been made.
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can modulate the degree to which people feel or act com-
mitted, or expect each other to feel or act committed. The
standard philosophical characterization of commitment in
the strict sense does not provide any basis for identifying
these factors. To fill this gap, Michael et al. [6] have recently
proposed a framework based upon an analysis of theminimal
structure of situations in which a sense of commitment can
arise. This minimal structure can be expressed as follows:
(a) There is an outcome which an agent (ME) either desires
to come about, or which is the goal of an action which
ME is currently performing or intends to perform. We
will refer to this outcome as ‘G’ (for ‘goal’).
(b) The external contribution (X) of a second agent (YOU)
is crucial2 to bringing about G.
Clearly, conditions (a) and (b) specify a broader category
than that of commitment in the strict sense. Nevertheless, sit-
uations with this structure may elicit a sense of commitment
on the part of one or both agents.Wepropose to conceptualize
the sense of commitment as follows:
ME has a sense that YOU is committed to performing X
to the extent that ME expects X to occur because (a) and (b)
obtain.
YOU has a sense of being committed to performing X
to the extent that YOU is motivated by her belief that ME
expects her to contribute X.
While this minimal structure is specified such that only
one agent (ME) desires G and/or has G as a goal, there are
many cases in which both agents desire G and/or have the
goal G. In those cases, the sense of commitment may be
mutual, with each agent having a sense of being committed
as well as a sense that the other agent is committed.
It is also worth emphasizing that the two agents (ME and
YOU) may differ with respect to their sense of commitment.
Thus, ME may have a sense that YOU is committed even
though YOU does not have a sense of being committed. Or
YOUmay have a sense of being committed even though ME
does not have a sense that YOU is committed.
One virtue of the minimal approach is that it illuminates
the conditions under which human agents feel and/or act
committed, or feel and/or act as though a commitment were
owed to them, even though they would not explicitly judge
that a commitment is in place—i.e. it occurs when a sense
of commitment is elicited. Moreover, the minimal approach
makes it possible to identify various factors that modulate the
degree of the sense of commitment, i.e. the extent to which
agents are prepared to rely upon expectations about external
contributions to their goals (and to shared goals), and the
extent to which they are motivated to make contributions to
2 In saying that the contribution is crucial, wemean that it is a necessary
component of a particular strategy for bringing about G.
others’ goals and to shared goals. Specifically, the minimal
approach entails that any factor will raise the sense of com-
mitment if it either raises the likelihood that ME will expect
X to occur at least in part because she has the goal G or
desires that G come about, or if it raises the likelihood that
YOU will have a motivation to do X at least in part because
YOU believes that ME expects this.
2.2 Functions of Commitment and the Sense of
Commitment
One important consequence of commitments, if they are
credible, is that theymake agents’ behavior predictable in the
face of fluctuations in their desires and interests [8]. Thus,
they make it possible to have expectations that one would
not otherwise have about contributions that other agents are
likely to make to one’s goals, or to have more reliable expec-
tations than one would otherwise have. This is clearly a very
useful social function, in part because itmakes peoplewilling
to performactions that they otherwisewould not perform—to
work, for example, given that somebody has made a commit-
ment to pay them for it, or to lift one end of a heavy table
that cannot be moved by one person alone. More specifically,
having reliable expectations about others’ actions facilitates
cooperation and coordination. In cooperation problems, such
as the prisoners’ dilemma game [9], individuals are tempted
to defect in order tomaximize their own benefits but by coop-
erating maximize the overall group benefit. In coordination
problems, on the other hand, such as the stag hunt game [10],
two agents each maximize their individual benefits if they
coordinate their actions, but get no benefit if they try to coor-
dinate but fail to do so, and are therefore tempted to opt for
a smaller benefit which does not depend upon coordinating
with the other agent. Moreover, having reliable expectations
about others’ contributions to one’s goals, or to shared goals,
is also useful insofar as it may facilitate the planning of joint
actions with complementary subplans, which depend upon
and build upon each other, as well as the online coordination
of joint actions among multiple agents [11,12].
However, making credible commitments is not a trivial
matter. When one makes a commitment to perform a par-
ticular action, one forecloses the possibility of performing
other actions (or no action at all). But if some unforeseen
alternative option arises whichmaximizes one’s interests and
is thus more desirable than the action to which one is com-
mitted, why should one not revise one’s plan and take the
alternative option? In other words, what motivates one to
honor a commitment to perform an action that is not in one’s
best interest? Indeed, this issue is even more serious than it
appears at first glance, insofar as the flipside of motivation
is credibility: why should one agent expect some other agent
to remain committed to a particular action if that second
agent’s desires or interests change? And if that second agent
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cannot be expected to honor her commitment, then it would
be unwise to rely on it. Hence, in the absence of a motivation
to honor a commitment, it is unclear how that commitment
could perform the function of generating and/or stabilizing
expectations about contributions agent will make to the goals
of other agents or to shared goals. And a commitment that
fails to perform this function will not facilitate the planning
and coordination of actions involving multiple agents, nor
will it increase individual agents’ motivation to contribute to
other agents’ goals or to shared goals, nor will it increase
their willingness to rely on other agents’ contributions.
Yet humans routinely succeed in making commitments
which other humans are willing to rely on, and they routinely
(though of course not always) honor their commitments.How
do they do this? In some cases, humans make commitments
credible by deliberately changing the material payoff struc-
ture of action options, e.g. by signing contracts that entail
penalties for reneging, so that reneging is no longer an attrac-
tive outside option. In other cases, humans are motivated to
honor their commitments, and/or expect others to commit-
ments because their sense of commitment is elicited. As we
noted in the previous section, the sense of commitment can
be elicited and enhanced by any factor which leads one agent
(ME) to expect a second agent (YOU) to make a contribu-
tion to a bringing about a goal or a desired state of affairs,
or by any factor which leads that second agent (YOU) to be
motivated to contribute at least in part because she believes
that the first agent (ME) expects her to. Some examples may
help to illustrate this.
First, ME may expect YOU to make the contribution
because YOU has a reputation for making such contribu-
tions, and/orYOUmaybemotivated byher desire tomaintain
that reputation [13]. Secondly, humans may be motivated to
honor commitments because doing so is associated with pos-
itive emotions (self-esteem; [14]) while reneging can cause
them to experience negative emotions (cf. anticipatory guilt,
[15,16]).Moreover, peoplemayalso expect others to bemoti-
vated by such emotions, and for this reason be willing to rely
on others. Thirdly, inmany contexts, simple bodily cues, such
as eye contact or characteristically cooperative movement
dynamics, may often suffice for one agent (ME) to express
her expectation that a second agent (YOU) will contribute X,
and/or for the second agent (YOU) to express her intention
to make that contribution [17–19].
So far,wehave seen that a sense of commitment canhelp to
motivate agents to honor commitments in the strict sense, and
can lead them to expect others to honor their commitments
as well, and we have also seen that a sense of commitment
can also give rise to such motivations and expectations when
explicit commitments are not in place. Hence, the sense of
commitment is an important feature of human social life,
which helps to stabilize cooperation and to facilitate coordi-
nation. For this reason, it is worth considering whether and
how it may be possible to implement a sense of commitment
in human–robot interaction.
3 A General Challenge
One conceptual challenge arises immediatelywhen consider-
ing how to design robots that can participate in commitments
with humans. And that is that many people might simply be
unprepared to believe that robots are appropriate candidates
for participating in commitments. Call this the ‘But robots
can’t commit!’ objection (cf. [20, p. 135]). The intuition
behind such an objection may be that robots are programmed
to act in specific ways and therefore not free to value action
options simply because they have made a commitment to do
so. Commitments involve a resistance to the pull of tempting
outside options. But how could a robot ever resist the action
option that it is programmed to value most highly? On the
other hand, if the robot is programmed simply to do what
it has committed to doing, then one might doubt whether it
is doing so because of the commitment rather than simply
because it is programmed to favor action options to which it
has committed.
Clearly, this objection taps very fundamental and complex
issues (Is free will a prerequisite for making commitments?
Do humans even have free will? Etc.). Luckily, we believe it
is both possible and productive to get around this objection
by taking a pragmatic approach.
Our starting point is the hypothesis that even if a human
agent does not explicitly believe that a robot can make com-
mitments, or that she herself owes it to a robot to honor
a commitment that she has made to the robot, she may
nevertheless implicitly sense the opposite. This hypothesis
can be motivated by considering evidence that people fre-
quently confide in robots and experience their relationship
with robots as being characterized by trust even if they do not
explicitly believe that the robot is conscious or has emotions,
etc. [21,22]. Moreover, the hypothesis can also be further
motivated by noting that people often act as though commit-
ted and trust other agents to do so even when they would
not explicitly judge that a commitment really is in place. An
examplewill help to illustrate this: Sam is cleaning up the liv-
ing room and picks up a ball that had been lying on the floor.
As it happens, his dogWoofer notices this and bounds over to
him, apparently ready to play fetch. Sam was not intending
to play fetch and does not particularly desire to, but may now
feel obligated to, because he has generated an expectation on
the part of Woofer that they will now play fetch together. In
cases like this one, one may sense that a commitment is in
place and act accordingly even if one would explicitly deny
that there is any commitment. By the same token, one some-
times treats artifacts such as laptops and mobile phones as
though they were committed to contributing to one’s goals.
For example, if Frank is counting on his mobile phone to pro-
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vide him with the address of the party to which he is invited,
but the mobile phone fails to do so (e.g. because the battery
runs out or the file has been deleted), he may become angry
at the mobile phone as though it had betrayed him.
Thus, the challenge to roboticists need not be (although it
could be) to design robots that really do engage in commit-
ments in the strict sense or which people explicitly believe
can engage in commitments in the strict sense, but to design
robots with whom human agents tend to interact as though
such commitments were in play regardless of whether human
agents explicitly judge that they are in play. In other words,
the challenge that we are focusing on is the challenge of
implementing a sense of commitment in human–robot inter-
action.
In addressing this challenge, it will be helpful to bear two
separate distinctions in mind. First of all, it is important to
distinguish between the perspective of a human interactant
and the perspective of the robot. Secondly, it is important
distinguish the direction of the commitment—i.e. a robot
being or seeming to be committed toward a human versus
a human being or seeming to be committed a robot. The
combination of these two distinctions yields four distinct but
mutually compatible forms which a sense of commitment
could take in human–robot interaction:
(i) A human has a sense of being committed toward a
robot—i.e., a human agent is motivated to perform
X, which is a crucial contribution to a robot’s goal or
desired state (G), at least in part because she believes
that the robot agent expects her to. If this is possible,
it could provide new possibilities for motivating people
to perform important actions such as taking their med-
ication, practicing proper hygiene, practicing new skills
that they are learning, and putting in the requisite level
of effort at manufacturing jobs.
(ii) A human has a sense that a robot is committed toward
her—i.e., a human agent expects a robot agent to per-
formX because X is a crucial contribution to the human
agent’s goal or desired state (G). If this is possible, it
could increase human agents’ willingness to rely upon
robots and thus to perform actions which entail a risk,
e.g. in rescue operations, operating theaters or military
contexts.
(iii) A robot has a sense of being committed toward a
human—i.e., a robot agent is motivated to perform X,
which is a crucial contribution to a human agent’s goal
or desired state (G), at least in part because it registers
that the human agent expects it to. If this is possible,
it could provide new possibilities for making robots’
motivational systems sensitive to human expectations
and thereby facilitate coordination in many contexts.
Moreover, it could enhance (ii) by providing a human
agent with evidence to support (ii).
(iv) A robot has a sense that a human is committed toward
it—i.e. a robot agent expects a human agent to perform
XbecauseX is a crucial contribution to the robot agent’s
goal or desired state (G). This could enhance (i) by
enabling the robot to actively elicit the human’s sense
of commitment.
In order to illustrate how these forms of a sense of com-
mitment may be implemented in human–robot interaction,
the next section will be devoted to identifying and briefly
discussing several concrete factors which may give rise to
and/or enhance the sense of commitment in human–robot
interaction.
4 Implementing the Sense of Commitment in
Human–Robot Interaction: Concrete Factors
The set of factors that we will be discussing is by no means
exhaustive. As we have already noted, the minimal approach
which we are building upon allows for a broad range of
factors to qualify as modulating the degree of the sense of
commitment (cf. [6]). In general, any factor which raises one
agent’s (i.e.ME’s) expectation that a second agent (i.e. YOU)
will perform X at least in part because X is a crucial contri-
bution to ME’s goal or desired state (G), raises ME’s sense
that YOU is committed to doing X. And any factor which
raises YOU’s motivation to do X at least in part because
YOU believes that ME expects this, raises YOU’s sense of
being committed to ME. The aim of the current section is to
illustrate how this framework can be implemented by iden-
tifying six concrete factors which appear prima facie to be
feasible and potentially effective. We will discuss each of
these in turn.
4.1 Reputation Management
One factor which could play an important role in implement-
ing a robot’s sense of being committed toward a human (i.e.
form (iii) in our taxonomy) is a mechanism for reputation
management. Thus, a robot could in principle be designed in
such a way as to cultivate and sustain a reputation for making
crucial contributions in joint actions with humans. Given that
even some species of fish keep track of and actively manage
reputations [23], it may not be at all far-fetched to believe
that robots could also exhibit an analogous capacity.
By interacting with such a robot over time, a human could
build up an expectation that the robot would make crucial
contributions to the human’s goals and desired states, and
consequently be willing to rely on the robot. In other words,
it may be possible to implement form (ii) from our taxonomy,
i.e. to enhance a human’s sense that the robot is commit-
ted to her. This may also be achieved by providing humans
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with appropriate background information about the robot,
e.g. third-parties could inform people that they had found
the robot to have a pronounced sense of commitment toward
people and/or to expect the same of its human collabora-
tors (on the top-down effects of humans’ background beliefs
about robots with whom they are interacting, see [24]). In
this connection, it is worth noting that previous research has
shown that such gossip can profoundly influence people’s
willingness to cooperate in various contexts [25]. Indeed, in
the context of a trust game, [26] observed the same phenom-
enon evenwhen participants could have accessed the relevant
information by direct observation. And [27] found that par-
ticipants mademore risky investment decisions with partners
when they had been informed by a third-party that the partner
had a good reputation.
4.2 Emotions
Emotions are of central importance for the sense of commit-
ment for at least two distinct reasons. First, emotions may
be crucial in motivating agents to honor commitments. In
particular, [28] has argued that the possibility of reneging on
a commitment and taking some tempting alternative option
may appear less tempting to people insofar as they anticipate
the likely emotional outcomes of reneging, such as guilt,
shame, anger, disgust, etc. [15,16]). Thus, such emotions—
or functional equivalents thereof—in robots may provide a
motivation to doX,whichmayhelp in implementing a robot’s
sense of being committed to a human, as well as a human’s
sense that the robot is committed to her. Secondly, one agent’s
emotional expressions can signal a sense of commitment to
a second agent [29]. For example, if YOU expresses frustra-
tion when ME’s attempts to bring about G are unsuccessful,
this could enhance ME’s sense that YOU is committed. Both
of these functions of emotions could in principle be imple-
mented in robots.
With respect to the motivational role of emotions, the
challenge would be to implement functional states in robots
which play this role. In other words, the challenge need
not be to implement real emotions. Instead, robots could be
designed with states that play the functional roles of guilt,
fear or disgust inmotivating it to honor (implicit and explicit)
commitments. If humans are informed of this and/or have the
opportunity to observe it, it may increase their willingness to
rely on the robot. It is interesting in this context to note that
humans do tend to ascribe feelings to robots. For example,
[30] reported that human participants reacted empathically
(i.e. rejoicing or commiserating) to images of a dinosaur-
robot either being treated in a friendly way or being tortured.
With respect to the implementation of emotional expres-
sions as signals of a sense of commitment, one challenge
is that robots have different bodies from humans and may
therefore be unable to express emotions in a way that elicits
the same type of response from human interactants as human
expressions of emotions. Indeed, in view of the well-known
uncanny valley effect [31], it may be counterproductive to
design robots such that they express emotions in a way that
too closely parallels human emotional expressiveness. In
order to address this challenge, it would be useful to identify
particular forms of expression that work well in humans. For
example, perhaps facial expressions of emotion would not be
the most feasible (in view of the uncanny valley effect), but
bodily posture or tone of voice might be more effective. By
the same token, it could be useful to develop robots’ capac-
ity to monitor and respond sensitively to humans’ emotional
expressions. As [32] have shown, people tend to have more
favorable impressions of robots that are responsive to their
(i.e. humans’) emotionally meaningful disclosures.
4.3 Eye Contact
There are several interesting studies showing the importance
of eye contact in human–human joint actions. For example,
[33] devised a stag hunt game inwhich four-year-old children
could choose to attempt to attain a small prize (i.e. the hare,
in this case represented bymarginally cool stickers) or a large
prize (i.e. the stag, in this case represented by much cooler
stickers). In order to attain the large prize, they had to operate
a large lever which could only be operated if the other player
also opted to go for the larger prize,whereas they could obtain
the smaller prize by operating a smaller lever by themselves.
The interesting finding was that the children were far more
likely to go for the large prize if there had been eye contact
with the other player, i.e. signaling an implicit commitment
to coordinate efforts in order to obtain the larger prize. The
notion that eye contact generates an implicit commitment
to be cooperative gains further support from and interesting
study by [34]. In a gaze-cueing paradigm, they presented par-
ticipants with faces gazing either to the right or to the left,
and participants that either reliably cued, or reliably failed to
cue, the location of an object which appeared shortly there-
after, and which participants had the task of detecting. What
they found was that participants were equally likely to fol-
low the gaze of the seen faces, regardless of how helpful this
was, but that they tended to rate the unhelpful faces as less
trustworthy than the helpful faces—as though the unhelpful
faces had violated an implicit commitment.
These findings reveal that eye contact can under certain
circumstances increase one agent’s (ME’s) expectation that a
second agent (YOU) will perform X, which is a crucial con-
tribution to G, a goal or desired state of ME. In addition, they
indicate that eye contact can also increase YOU’s motivation
to perform X by leading her to believe that ME expects this.
An obvious challenge that may arise in using eye contact
this way in human–robot interaction is that robots’ specific
bodily forms may make it difficult for them to give such
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signals as easily as humans (but see [35]). However, it is
worth noting that humanparticipants respond to cartoon faces
[36,37] much in the same way as they respond to human
faces in gaze cueing paradigms, i.e. they tend to follow gaze
direction. Indeed, [38] found that even young children tend
to follow the gaze direction of robots as long as those robots
act in a way that is contingent upon their actions, and thus
appear to be contingently responsive to them. Intriguingly,
in one experiment, the robots did not even have faces but
merely front and rear sides. Hence, it could be possible to
design robots that could engage in eye contact even without
having faces, and certainly without having human-like faces.
4.4 Signaling
There has also been a great deal of research in recent years
on what has been called ’signaling’, i.e. a form of charac-
teristically cooperative movements dynamics in joint action
[12,19,39,40]. For example, [19] found that participants
tended to sacrifice efficiency of movement in order to make
their movements more easily and quickly predictable for
their partners. Insofar as this type of signaling constitutes an
investment in the joint action, and demonstrates awillingness
to coordinate with one’s partner, and also an expectation that
the one’s partner will remain engaged. As a result, it could
enhance the partner’s YOU’s sense of being committed until
the goal is reached. If so, it is plausible that signaling could
also have such effects in human–robot interactions. After all,
there is no need to have the same bodily shape as a human
in order to adapt one’s movements to make them more pre-
dictable, as [19] results indicate. Indeed, work by [17] has
shown that it is possible to identify bodily cues that corre-
late with trust in dyadic interactions, and to design robots to
exhibit and to identify such cues.
4.5 Coordination
While the foregoing remarks about emotional expression
and signaling pertain to bodily cues exhibited by individuals
within interactions, there is also research suggesting that the
interpersonal dynamics within social interactions may also
modulate the sense of commitment Specifically, Michael et
al. (in preparation) contrasted a condition with a high degree
of coordination (e.g. two agents form a chain to clean up a
pile of sand, with one agent scooping up a bucket of sand and
passing it to the second agent, who then empties it into a con-
tainer) with a separate condition involving a low degree of
coordination (the same two agents work alongside each other
without forming a chain), and found evidence that the former
condition generated a greater sense of commitment. Accord-
ing to the minimal framework sketched above, coordination
generates commitment because, when one agent (ME) per-
forms a subtask depending upon the second agent (YOU)
performing her subtask, she expresses her expectation that
the second agent will in fact perform her subtask, and thereby
elicits YOU’s sense of commitment.
4.6 Mutual Supportiveness
As philosophers have observed [2,41–44], characteristically
human ‘shared cooperative activity (SCA)’ often requires
participants to carry out complementary, or meshing, sub-
plans, and to be able and willing to flexibly adjust their
subplans in order to bring about their shared goals. For exam-
ple, if two individuals want to paint a house together, they
will have to agree not only on the shared goal of painting the
house but on the specific subplans which theywill implement
in order to achieve their shared goal; one of them may buy
the paint while the other one buys the brushes, etc. On Brat-
man’s [41] influential analysis, the shared intention to achieve
a shared goal is formed in accordance with and because of
such meshing subplans. In addition to a shared goals and
meshing subplans, though, [41] also specifies a further crite-
rion, namely mutual supportiveness3.
How might this be implemented in the case of human–
robot interaction? To begin with, let us note that there seems
to be no particular reason why robots should have specific
difficulties with identifying how goals can be achieved by
means of distinct meshing subplans, as [47] have already
demonstrated (cf. also [48]). After all, it seems plausible to
assume that a robot can coordinate with other (human or
non-human) agents, provided that the task is well-defined.
Some additional challenge could be presented in designing
robots that can flexibly adapt when a human partner appears
to need additional support, or to expect a human to flexi-
bly offer additional support. But if this is possible, the latter
may indicate a high level of motivation [i.e. form (iii) of the
sense of commitment], whereas the former could indicate
an expectation on the robot’s part that the human will make
crucial contributions, thus enhancing the robot’s sense that
the human is committed [form (iv)] and potentially also the
human’s sense of being committed [form (i)].
The feasibility of both of these capacities (i.e. to offer and
to expect mutual support) is illustrated by a recent project by
Clodic et al. [49]. Clodic and colleagues designed an interac-
tive robot guide, ‘Rackham’, who made explicit agreements
with museum visitors to guide them through an exhibition,
and who was able to monitor whether his ‘clients’ were fol-
lowing him, to wait for them, to adjust his pace to theirs,
etc.
3 The motivation to offer mutual support to each other when needed
may underpin a ‘mutual assumption of helpfulness,’ which is central to
the notion of shared intentionality ([45,46], cf. also Salice and Satne in
preparation).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed some of the central chal-
lenges that roboticists might face in implementing a sense of
commitment in human–robot interaction. Obviously, there
are deeper philosophical questions which our pragmatic
approach has not addressed. Specifically, we have said noth-
ing about whether a human agent would be right in thinking
that a robot interactant had the capacity to honor commit-
ments and to demand the same in return. In other words,
there is a further question about whether and under what con-
ditions robots can really engage in commitments. To be sure,
answering this question would require a larger investigation
of deep conceptual issues.Whatever one’s assessment of this
question, though, it seems clear that the potential is immense
for robots that exhibit and/or elicit a sense of commitment—
i.e. such that (i) humans agents are motivated by a sense of
commitment toward them, (ii), human agents expect them
to be motivated by a sense of commitment toward human
agents, (iii) they are motivated by a sense of commitment
toward human agents, and/or (iv) they expect human agents
to be motivated by a sense of commitment toward them.
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